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COUNT NOUNS – MASS NOUNS
NEAT NOUNS – MESS NOUNS
ABSTRACT: In this paper I propose and formalize a theory
of the mass-count distinction in which the denotations of count
nouns are built from non-overlapping generators, while the de-
notations of mass nouns are built from overlapping generators.
Counting is counting of generators, and it will follow that count-
ing is only correct on count denotations.
I will show that the theory allows two kinds of mass nouns:
mess mass nouns with denotations built from overlapping mini-
mal generators, and neat mass nouns with denotations built from
overlapping generators, where the overlap is not located in the
minimal generators. Prototypical mass nouns like meat and mud
are of the first kind. I will argue that mass nouns like furniture
and kitchenware are of the second type.
I will discuss several phenomena—all involving one way
or the other explicitly or implicitly individual classifiers like
stuks in Dutch—that show that both distinctions mass/count and
mess/neat are linguistically robust. I will show in particular that
nouns like kitchenware pattern in various ways like count nouns,
and not like mess mass nouns, and that these ways naturally in-
volve the neat structure of their denotation. I will also show that
they are real mass nouns: they can involve measures in the way
mess mass nouns can and count nouns cannot.
Mass Nouns 2
I will discuss grinding interpretations of count nouns, here
rebaptized fission interpretations, and argue that these interpre-
tations differ in crucial ways from the interpretations of lexical
mass nouns. The paper will end with a foundational problem
raised by fission interpretations, and in the course of this, atom-
less interpretation domains will re-enter the scene through the
back door.
1. ...OR NOT TO COUNT
Count nouns, like boy, can be counted, mass nouns, like salt, cannot:
(1) a. Øone boy/Øtwo boys/Øthree boys,. . .
b. #one salt/# two salt/ # three salt,. . .
The standard assumption about count nouns is that the denotation
of a count noun like boys is a structure of singularities and plurali-
ties, where the singularities are the semantic building blocks of the
structure, and we count pluralities in terms of these semantic building
blocks.
Why can’t we similarly count the denotations of mass nouns like meat
and salt? Is it something about the building blocks of mass noun deno-
tations, and if so, what?
In this section I discuss some answers to this question.
1.1. We could count mass nouns if we wanted to, but we don’t want to.
Let us make the most minimal assumption: there is a lexical feature
[+C] that count nouns and numerical expressions have and mass nouns
don’t, and felicitous combination of the numerical with the noun re-
quires unification of this feature. This theory predicts that count nouns
can be counted and mass nouns cannot.
Since the feature is not semantically interpreted, on this minimal
account, the lexicon chooses to assign the feature [+C] to some nouns
and not to others, and mass nouns cannot be counted, simply because
they are mass.
Jef Pelletier (in many papers from Pelletier 1975 to his presentation
at the Riga conference, see also Pelletier & Schubert 1989/2002) has
defended an account along these lines. For Pelletier the feature [+C]
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is not semantically interpreted because it shouldn’t be: mass nouns and
count nouns have in essence the same denotations. The arbitrariness
of the choice between mass nouns and count nouns is illustrated by the
fact, for instance, that spaghetti is mass and noodle is count, by the ex-
istence of minimal pairs like shoes/footware, and by the free shiftability
of nouns between mass and count uses.
While the facts about arbitrariness need to be acknowledged, it is
also well-known that the arbitrariness is not absolute: languages that
have the mass-count distinction tend to agree on what nouns are pro-
totypically mass and what are prototypically count, and one can ask
the same question for these classes: why don’t we count prototypical
mass nouns, and do we count prototypical count nouns?
Pelletier’s shiftability argument aims to show that we are better off
assuming that mass nouns and count nouns have the same denotation,
except for a bit of contextual restriction. According to Pelletier, nouns
shift freely between mass and count uses: mass nouns are packaged
as count nouns, as in (2a), while count nouns are ground into mass
nouns, as in (2b):
(2) a. We’d like three waters, please.
b. After the failed repair attempt, there was watch all over the
table.
Pelletier assumes that the easiest account of these facts is the assump-
tion that there is no semantic difference between the mass noun and
the count noun: when the feature [+C] is assigned, as in (2a), you can
count objects in the denotation of water, and they will be counted like
objects are counted (this one, and this one, and this one), while in (2b)
counting is lexically disabled, even though what there is on the table is
conceptually countable.
I will argue later in this paper, following Rothstein (2009a), that,
while grinding is indeed an operation available in the grammar, an
operation that maps count noun interpretations onto mass interpre-
tations, the output interpretations of grinding differ semantically in
crucial ways from normal mass interpretations. I will argue that the
ground interpretation of a count noun cannot be regarded as simply
the same interpretation with the count feature removed and maybe
some contextual restriction: grinding is a real semantic operation that
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maps the input (count) meaning onto a different (mass) meaning.
I will argue here that the same is true for packaging. I have ar-
gued myself in Landman (1991) that packaging on noun phrases is a
contextually available operation. Look at (3):
(3) Lord Peter, we have examined both the coffee in the cup and the
coffee in the pot, and neither have strychnine in them.
Both and neither require a sum of two things. Since coffee is a mass
noun, the coffee in the cup and the coffee in the pot sum up in the
mass domain to the mass sum of coffee, which is not a sum of two
things, because it is mass. We get the correct reading of (3) by pack-
aging the coffee in the cup and packaging the coffee in the pot as two
count atoms, and letting the conjunctive noun phrase denote the sum
of the two packages. In this contextual shift, there are no constraints
on packaging: you just treat the contextually relevant mass entities as
packages.
Now look at (2a). Suppose the waiter of Chez Jef comes back with
a tray on which stand: a scotch glass of carbonated water, a 2 liter
bottle of distilled water, and a test tube of water from the canal. We
wouldn’t find this an appropriate reaction to our request in (2a).
Why not? On the minimal account, we have added the [+C] fea-
ture and made objects in the denotation of water available to be se-
lected as count packages. If I say excuse me, we asked for three waters,
the waiter can answer: well, that’s what you got.
The inappropriateness of the waiter’s reaction is naturally accounted
for, if we assume that packaging of nouns is a grammatical construction
in which an implicit classifier is added:
[NOUN water]⇒ [NOUN[+C] [C LASSIF IER e] [NOUN water]]
On this view, the null classifier has a contextually provided classi-
fier meaning. Thus, a natural interpretation in context would be that
[C LASSIF IER e] is interpreted as glasses of, or (in Israel) half liter bot-
tles of. Since there is no relevant contextual classifier meaning that
comprises the three things that the waiter brings, his reaction is inap-
propriate.
On this view, packaging of nouns is a real semantic operation that
maps the input meaning of the mass noun onto a different output mean-
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ing of the count noun.
I claim, then, that linguistic evidence suggests that grinding and
packaging are not inverse operations that switch freely and without
much more semantics than a bit of contextual restriction between count
and mass uses of nouns. The fact that these operations have a real se-
mantics suggests, if anything, that the meanings of the count nouns
and the mass nouns are semantically different. So the question re-
mains: why can’t we count mass?
1.2. We could count mass nouns if we wanted to, but we choose not to.
We are now concerned with theories that do distinguish the meanings
of mass nouns and count nouns semantically. We said that pluralities
are counted in terms of their semantic building blocks. Following Link
(1983), we can define what counts as semantic building blocks in terms
of the notion of a plurality structure: we choose a particular part-of
relation, plural-part-of, in terms of which we define counting.
Link (1983) creates a sortal distinction between count nouns and
mass nouns: count nouns have a denotation in a plurality structure on
which a counting operation is defined, mass nouns have a denotation in
a structure which is disjoint from the count structure, a mass structure
on which a counting operation is not defined.
Krifka (1989) does not make this sortal distinction, but defines dif-
ferent partial orders on the same domain. The interpretation domain
is ordered by a partial order. For nouns that are [+C], the noun inten-
sion X and natural unit function NU determine in world w a set: AX ,w
= λx.NUX ,w(x)=1, the set of objects that naturally function as units
that count as 1 X in w.
A second partial order of plural part of is defined on a superset of
AX ,w in which the elements of AX ,w are the building blocks (the minimal
elements). As Krifka argues in a footnote, crucially his plural-part of
order cannot be simply lifted from the general order on the domain,
because the elements in AX ,w may overlap in terms of that order.
The analysis in Rothstein (2010) is similar both to Link’s and to
Krifka’s. With Link, she assumes a typal distinction between the deno-
tations of mass nouns and count nouns. With Krifka, she derives the
count noun denotations from a counting function which assigns the
value 1. Her analysis differs from Krifka’s in that she assumes that the
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minimal elements need not be conceptually natural objects, but can be
contextually selected, and conceptually rather arbitrary.
These theories distinguish mass denotations from count denota-
tions and assume that the latter, but not the former, are interpreted
relative to part-of structures for which counting is defined. If we don’t
go any further, we get what I would call a we-choose-not-to answer to
the question of why we can’t count mass nouns: we have two types
of structures, one that comes equipped with a counting operation and
one that does not, and mass nouns are interpreted in the structure that
is not equipped with the counting operation. In other words, count
nouns have the possibility of counting built into their meaning, while
mass nouns do not.
In that case, the answer to why we can’t count mass nouns is
simple: because we decided not to build the possibility of counting
into their meaning. Thus, we interpret the feature [±C] semantically,
but rather minimally: we don’t count mass nouns, because we have
equipped count nouns but not mass nouns with a counter: we can
choose between equipped and non-equipped interpretations of nouns,
and that’s all there is to it (an answer along this line is suggested in
Sybesma (2009)).
Interestingly enough, neither Link, nor Krifka, nor Rothstein seem
to regard this as a sufficiently insightful analysis. While separating
mass noun and count noun denotations typally, Link (1983) (and Land-
man 1991) make further assumptions about mass structures which
makes it structurally impossible to equip the mass domain with a count-
ing operation (see below).
Krifka (1989) assumes that the objects that count as one in a noun
denotation are selected to count as one by a natural unit function, and
suggests that mass nouns cannot be counted for conceptual reasons:
mass nouns do not come conceptually with natural units of counting,
while count nouns do.
Rothstein (2010) argues against this: many count nouns are con-
textually count and their semantic units are not necessarily ‘natural
units’ at all. She assumes that the count domain selects in context the
objects of count 1 to be objects that are in that context mutually dis-
joint. (following an earlier incarnation of the present paper).
The present paper is not about count nouns: I am sympathetic to all
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three approaches to count nouns. However, as far as mass nouns are
concerned, I share the discomfort: I find the we-choose-no-to-account
uninsightful and practically circular, and I think we can do a bit better.
1.3. We can’t count mass nouns because they have no semantic building
blocks or instable semantic building blocks.
The semantic building blocks of a count noun denotation are generally
assumed to be the minimal elements in that denotation. Hence count-
ing is counting of minimal elements. A very common assumption in the
earlier literature is that mass noun denotations differ from count noun
denotation in that mass noun denotations are not built from minimal
elements, or don’t have minimal elements at all (see e.g. ter Meulen
1980, Bunt 1985, Link 1983, Landman 1991). A representative exam-
ple is given by the following (almost) quote:
“What are the minimal parts of water? Chemistry tells us that they are
the water molecules. But water molecules can be counted, while water cannot
be counted. This shows that natural language semantics does not incorporate
the insights of chemistry in its models: in our semantic domains, the water
molecules are not the minimal parts of water. In fact, the real semantic ques-
tion is: is there any evidence, semantic evidence, to assume that mass entities
like water are built from minimal parts at all, either from minimal parts that
are water, or from minimal parts that aren’t water? If there is no such semantic
evidence, it is theoretically better to assume that the semantic system does not
impose a requirement of minimal parts.
Since there is no semantic evidence for minimal parts, we should assume non-
atomic structures for the mass domain. That has the added bonus that we can
nicely explain why we cannot count mass entities, because counting is counting
of atoms.” (paraphrase of Landman 1991, pp 312-313)
Chierchia 1998 challenges this view by pointing at mass nouns like
furniture (and others discussed in Pelletier & Schubert 1989/2002):
furniture consists of pieces of furniture, and just as parts of pieces of
furniture are not necessarily themselves pieces of furniture, in the same
way parts of pieces of furniture do not necessarily themselves count




(4) a. I moved the furniture around.
b. I moved the pieces of furniture around.
c. I switched the top drawer and the middle drawer in the
dresser.
If so, it is very unattractive to assume that the denotation of pieces of
furniture contains minimal elements, namely the individual pieces of
furniture, but the denotation of furniture does not. The first problem,
then, concerns what we could call non-prototypical mass nouns: mass
nouns with naturally minimal parts.
A second problem concerns prototypical mass nouns. It is what I
call the problem of homeopathic semantics. Look at (5):
(5) There is salt on the viewing plate of the microscope, one
molecule’s worth.
[–C]
The observation is that the mass noun salt in (5) is felicitous, though
intuitively, what is on the viewing plate doesn’t have any parts that
are themselves salt. If we assume that semantically the denotation of
salt is divisible, and salt has no minimal elements, then we are forced
to invent here an infinite structure of non-existent salt parts that are
themselves in the denotation of salt.
I call this homeopathic semantics: to postulate arcane semantic struc-
tures solely to avoid counting: we “dilute” the salt so far that not a
single molecule remains, yet semantically we continue to divide it into
parts that semantically count as salt.
But such an approach is implausible. The real observation is that
divisibility is plausible at a macro level, because at a macro level we
can unproblematically divide, say, water into two parts that both have
the right characteristics to count as water. But at a micro level, this is
no longer plausible, and at some level you reach a point where what
you have doesn’t divide anymore into two parts that can both count as
water.
So what is in the microscope is salt, but cannot be split into parts
that are themselves salt, hence, what is in the microscope is a pretty
good candidate for a minimal salt part.
The micro level doesn’t have to be this small. Look at the follow-
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ing picture: It’s a piece of wallpaper, of the kind that I would call in
Dutch driehoekjesbehang, triangle-patterned wallpaper, wallpaper with
little triangles.
Now, there is a sense in which any part of a piece of triangle-
patterned wallpaper can be called triangle-patterned wallpaper, even
if it doesn’t have the pattern on it (i.e. a piece that was cut out of a
role of triangle-patterned wallpaper). But there is another sense, and
that is the one I am interested in here, in which in order for a piece
of wallpaper to count as triangle-patterned wallpaper, it must contain
the pattern, i.e. a triangle. In this sense, if I cut a circle out of the
triangle patterned wallpaper above as in A, I wouldn’t call the piece
I have cut out driehoekjesbehang, but if I cut it as in B, I would: On
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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this interpretation, the circular piece in B can no longer be cut into
two parts, each of which counts itself as driehoekjesbehang. And this
piece can be part of a partition of the piece of wallpaper into parts
that all count as driehoekjesbehang, but cannot themselves be split into
two parts that both count as driehoekjesbehang. And these parts are
good candidates for (contextually provided) minimal parts. Note that
the division into two parts that both count as driehoekjesbehang is im-
portant here, because we are concerned with count. If we take one
piece of driehoekjesbehang we can often divide that into two pieces,
one of which continues to count as driehoekjesbehang, while the other
does not. I call this shaving: the piece that still counts as diehoek-
jesbehang after you have cut off a snippet counts as the same piece of
driehoekjesbehang, just as a clean-shaven version of me counts as the
same person. This means that I assume that the division into minimal
parts is a division up to intensional identity (the relation that makes the
shaved version and the unshaved version of me count as one). I will
refrain from developing this part of the theory, but I do assume that an
appropriate intensional identity relation has to be added.
Examples like this can be multiplied for mass nouns denoting pat-
terned materials. They show that the idea that elements in the denota-
tion of a mass noun can always be split into parts that are also in the
denotation of the mass noun is unwarranted.
In many respects the theory developed in Chierchia (2010) moves
back from the proposals in Chierchia (1998) towards the homeopathic
theory. Chierchia (2010) assumes that you cannot count mass nouns
because the minimal elements in the denotation of the mass noun can
be, what he calls, instable, where an element in a denotation N is in-
stable if it is vague whether the element should count as one or as two.
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Obviously if you don’t know of your minimal elements whether they
count as one or as two or as many, you can’t count them.
Since Chierchia (1998) argues that this situation is not what goes
on in the denotation of nouns like furniture, in the recent paper, Chier-
chia pooh-poohs the importance of mass nouns like furniture, moving
to a position that, after all, these aren’t really ‘real’ mass nouns.
I find this move disappointing, and will argue later in this paper
that furniture nouns really are ‘real’ mass nouns (though ‘neat’ ones).
Neither am I charmed by the analysis in terms of instable minimal el-
ements, because I think that, on closer view, this is just a variant of
the homeopathic theory: while the theory doesn’t assume that you can
continue to divide elements in a mass noun denotation infinitely, i.e.
smaller and smaller, it seems to assume that you can divide them indef-
initely, smaller and smaller, approaching but never surely reaching the
‘true’ non-vague minimal elements.
The problem is that this theory is also homeopathic. The cases of
salt in the microscope and triangle-patterned wallpaper are as problem-
atic for Chierchia’s later theory as they are for the ’no minimal ele-
ments’ theory: what there is in the microscope is not an instable ele-
ment in Chierchia’s sense. In fact, put two molecules in the microscope:
in that case you can partition the salt into two parts, neither of which
can be partitioned into salt. Also in this case, there is salt in the mi-
croscope, but not instable salt in Chierchia’s sense: the two-molecule
structure can only be bi-partitioned into parts that count as salt that
cannot themselves be bi-partitioned into salt. The instability that Chier-
chia requires for mass noun denotations (‘don’t know whether it’s one
or two’) is absent.
The same is true in the case of driehoekjesbehang: none of the parts
in the partition indicated for the triangle-patterned wallpaper are in-
stable in Chierchia’s sense, because they can only count as one. Yet, we
cannot count triangle-patterned wallpaper.
I think that the homeopathic account, whether in the classical form
or in the form of Chierchia (2010), is untenable.
1.4. We can’t count mass nouns because they have vague building blocks.
This is suggested by Chierchia (1998). Chierchia (2010) can be re-
garded as his way of making this suggestion precise in such a way that
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the vagueness involved distinguishes mass nouns from count nouns:
mass nouns have instable minimal elements, while count nouns have
stable minimal elements. I am not denying that Chierchia’s notion of
instability may be a useful notion. I do not think though that it can be
used to distinguish mass nouns from count nouns, and I do not think
that it can be used to explain why mass nouns cannot be counted.
As Chierchia (2010) realizes very well, other notions of vagueness
discussed in the vagueness literature are patently not notions that tell
mass nouns apart from count nouns, and hence cannot be used to dis-
tinguish the two.
-Cardinal vagueness
Look at the examples in (6):
(6) a. How many quarks are there in the water in the sea?
[+C]
b. #There is more than two water in the sea.
[-C]
We don’t know how many quarks there are in the water, and the num-
ber may even be truly undetermined (because of quantum mechanics).
But that doesn’t prevent quark from being count, and (6a) from being
felicitous. We don’t know how many minimal parts of water there are
in the sea, but arguably, whatever the number, it’s more than two: if
we divide the water naturally into two parts that are water, normally
these will divide themselves into parts that are water. So the statement
in (2b) should be true in a natural context; but, of course, that doesn’t
make it felicitous.
-Borderline vagueness Maybe we can assume that the denotation of
mass nouns like salt is generated from building blocks that are not salt,
nor non-salt, but borderline salt. The problem is that in the nominal
domain, borderline vagueness is typically found with classifier nouns,
count nouns that include a quantitative size dimension in their meaning,
like grain and heap:
-you have to have the right size to be a grain, and the right size to be a
heap, and what is the right size is vague, precisely because the mean-
ings of these count nouns involves a quantitative dimension, and this
is what brings in problems like the Sorites paradox. But prototypical
mass nouns like water and salt are not vague in this sense.
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-Higher-order vagueness
On accounts of higher order vagueness, it is not the set of atoms which
is vague, but the whole part-of structure itself. Such an account needs
to be formalized, of course.
Chierchia’s (2010) account can be understood as an analysis in this
spirit, and so can the analysis that I will present here (though I don’t
think of it in terms of vagueness myself).
So I have nothing as such against the idea that we cannot count
mass noun denotations because they involve higher order vagueness,
and count nouns do not, since it may well be possible to reformulate
my account in those terms.
1.5. We cannot count mass noun denotations because we cannot pull the
semantic building blocks out of the mass noun denotation.
In the analysis of Chierchia (1998), count nouns have access to the
set of building blocks, while mass nouns do not. The account can be
illustrated with the Dutch triple in (7):
(7) meubel meubels meubilair
piece of furniture pieces of furniture furniture
singular count plural count mass
For the count noun, Chierchia follows Hoeksema’s (1983) account, in
which the singular noun denotes a set of atoms, the plural noun de-
notes the closure of that set under sum minus the set of atoms. The
mass noun, for Chierchia, denotes the union of the two, i.e. just the
closure of the singular noun under sum:
∗P = {y: ∃X ⊆ P: y = ⊔X}
(8) meubel −→ MEUBEL a set of atoms
meubels −→ ∗MEUBEL – MEUBEL
meubilair−→ ∗MEUBEL
This semantic choice was always unfortunate, in the light of the well
known problems that Hoeksema’s analysis of plurals faces (as discussed
in Lasersohn (1988), Rothstein (1992), summarized in Landman (2000)).
But the main idea of Chierchia’s analysis can be maintained without
having to rely on Hoeksema’s account. The essence of the analysis
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is that the interpretations of the singular and plural count noun are
derived from a lexically provided set of atoms in terms of which we
count, and the interpretation of the mass noun is not. The access to
this set of atoms is preserved in the count noun interpretations, and
the interpretations of numericals refer to it.
We can easily deal with this, if we make our semantic representa-
tions a bit richer. Let the noun meaning be a pair, of which the first
element is the standard interpretation, and the second element the
Chierchia set, which is lexically provided, and semantically accessed
by the interpretations of the numericals. Thus:
(9) meubel −→ <MEUBEL, MEUBEL> with MEUBEL
a set of atoms
meubels −→ <∗MEUBEL, MEUBEL>
meubilair−→ <∗MEUBEL, – >
On this account, the plural and the mass noun have the same interpre-
tation, but only the first allows access to the set of atoms MEUBEL, the
second element of the pair.
As we will see below, my own proposal for the semantics of nouns
like furniture is very close to this, except that in the theory to be de-
veloped, the second element of the pair plays a different and more
fundamental role.
On Chierchia’s theory, the difference between the plural meubels
and the mass noun meubilair lies only in the lexical access to the set of
atoms, there is no difference in structure. Since the theory is a general
theory of mass nouns, mass nouns like salt and mud are assumed to
have the same kinds of denotations:
(10) salt −→<∗MIN-SALT, – > where MIN-SALT is a set of atoms
Chierchia assumes that the set MIN-SALT is vague, unlike the set of
minimal elements of count nouns. As we have seen, it isn’t clear what
notion of vagueness would be at stake here (note that Chierchia’s later
theory is not a modification of the theory under discussion here, but a
rejection of it.)
As I see it, the main problem with the theory of Chierchia (1998) is
that the mass and the count denotations are so close that one seriously
wonders why languages have the mass-count distinction at all.
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We encode lexical access to the set of atoms only in count nouns,
and hence mass nouns cannot be counted. But why don’t they shift in
context, when the set of atoms is made salient: The language easily
allows me to package water into macro packages, but not into minimal
water parts:
(11) a. I would like two coffees, two cognacs and two waters,
please.
b. #There are far more than a billion waters in this cup of
water.
It seems that, if there isn’t any deeper reason why we cannot count
mass nouns than Chierchia gives, the packaging in (11b) ought to be
the most obvious one available. But it isn’t. And is it just an imper-
fection of mass nouns that the set of atoms is not available? Why do
languages bother distinguishing mass nouns and count nouns?
A set of atoms is sitting at the bottom of the mass noun denotation
and at the bottom of the count noun denotation. The theory postulates
that it can be pulled out in the second case, but not in the first case, and
this is why you can’t count. The problem is that it is not particularly
difficult to semantically or contextually pull a set of atoms out of an
atomic structure. . . . a child can do it. And there, of course, is the
problem: the child doesn’t do it.
2. VARIANTS
2.1. Counting and non-overlap.
All theories of count nouns that define counting in terms of a partial or-
der take care to distinguish the order relative to which counting takes
place from the partial order these things stand in in the mass domain.
In all these theories, there is a counting function that will count a plu-
rality in count denotation X in terms of its parts in X that count as
one.
For prototypical count nouns, these parts that count as one will not
overlap in the mass sense either, they will have no part in common: i.e.
prototypically the denotations of boy, soccer ball and planet are sets of
the elements that are mutually disjoint. But mass overlap is, of course,
not impossible: my two hands and my ten fingers are objects in the
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count domain, and there are predicates like body part that may include
them all. But the way counting works is that, if we can count entities
simultaneously as one, the partial order in terms of which the counting
is done, starts from the elements that count as one, and ignores their
potential mass overlap, i.e. the count domain treats these entities as if
they do not overlap.
As we said, prototypically count nouns have minimal elements that
do not overlap in the first place. As Rothstein (2010) argues, nouns
that include overlapping entities normally restrict their denotation to
eliminate the overlap. Thus, we may count a fence structure put up by
four farmers as one fence, or as four fences, but not normally as five.
There are situations where the overlap is not eliminated. Recently,
I ordered a set of Krifka-Rothstein Outfits For All Occasions (cf. Krifka
(2009)):
1. The pants and the shirt (for informal meetings)
2. The pants and the shirt and the tie (for informal meet-
ings with Europeans)
3. The pants and the shift and the jacket (for formal meet-
ings)
4. The pants and the shirt and the tie and the jacket (for
formal meetings with Europeans)
5. The pants and the shirt and the tie and the jacket and
the vest (in case I get invited to dine at High Table)
And, I have a fitting kipah, yarmulka, in case any of these occasions
involves a religious ceremony, which makes all together 10 outfits (in
fact, there are more combinations, but I don’t have occasions for them).
As Krifka (2009) argues, these outfits are intensional entities, in
that they do not all simultaneously exist in one and the same situation.
And in fact, this is shown in the following counting situation:
(12) Customs officer: What’s in the suitcase?
Me: My Krifka-Rothstein outfits.
Customs officer: How many outfits?
Me: Ten.
Customs officer: I am sorry Sir, custom regulations are that you
can only bring five outfits into the country.
Me: Ok, leave out the kipah.
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(12) is, of course, unnatural: the counting has at most joke status. Real
counting is what we find in (13):
(13) There will be no religious ceremonies this trip, so only five
outfits are relevant.
For the arithmetic to come out correctly here, we must count each outfit
as one, and ignore the mass overlap. We do this either by packaging—
treating each sum of clothing as an atomic individual in its own right
(following Link 1984)—or by defining a new count part-of relation on
the sums of clothing, which too treats the mass overlap as irrelevant
(following Krifka 1989). And we must do this, because, as Krifka 1989
stresses, counting is an additive measure in that 1+1=2 only holds for
1’s that do not overlap, and in the count domain 1+1 is indeed 2.
So, we all agree, then, that count means non-overlap, or overlap
made irrelevant. If so, maybe the problem with counting in the mass
domain is overlap, or overlap not made irrelevant. This is the underlying
idea of the present analysis.
2.2. Variants
All the proposals discussed so far can be seen as being formulated one
way or other in terms of underspecification:
-Mass is mass because it isn’t specified as count.
-Mass is mass because it isn’t equipped with a counting function
-Mass is mass because looking down in a mass denotation, you don’t
see any building blocks.
-Mass is mass because looking down in a mass denotation, you don’t
see the building blocks clearly.
-Mass is mass because you see the building blocks all right, but cannot
pull them out.
My proposal is formulated in terms of overspecification: I propose that
when you look down in a mass denotation you see too many building
blocks. And hence, when you count building blocks in a mass denota-
tion, you will count them wrong. We will take our inspiration from the
following example. The picture shows a body of water, and sentence
(14), with mass noun salt, is felicitous and true:
(14) There is salt[–C] in the water, two molecules worth.
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Now, there is two molecules worth of salt in the water. But which two
molecules?
SALT1+SALT2 or SALT3+SALT4?
On the perspective on which we count, we have two variants of salt
each with two non-overlapping building blocks (in the example, the
molecules): SALT1+SALT2 versus SALT3+SALT4. For counting we choose
one of these variants, and we count relative to it.
I am proposing here that for mass noun denotations we do not make
the choice between these variants: as far as the mass denotation of
salt is concerned, it is equally appropriate to regard the salt as be-
ing built from SALT1+SALT2 as it is to regard it as being built from
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SALT3+SALT4, and in fact, we don’t make the choice and regard the
salt as built, simultaneously if you want, from both variants. Thus, the
mass perspective merges all variants into one part-of structure, so to say
scrambles them and gives (in the example) four overlapping building
blocks.
We assume that counting is counting of semantic building blocks.
If you insist on counting the building blocks in the denotation of the
mass noun salt, you will count overlapping building blocks (four, in the
example), and you are guaranteed to count wrong!
This is the proposal of the present paper:
The denotations of mass nouns cannot be counted, because
counting goes wrong!
On this proposal, the reason you cannot count prototypical mass noun
denotations is not ‘vertical’: it’s not that when you look down you see
nothing, or nothing very well. The reason is ‘horizontal’: when you
look around you at the other building blocks, you see a multitude of
overlapping building blocks coming from different variants.
In general, we get variants by dividing objects into parts in different
ways, without making a choice between these different ways of divi-
sion. We took the case of salt dissolved in water as our model. But
many other cases come to mind. The unit structure of a crystal like
diamond forms a lattice structure. But the structure is part of a larger
lattice structure and there is more than one way of partitioning the
crystal into its crystal units: Division A is not more ‘real’ than division
B: What about, say, gold, which in its metal state is neatly built up from
gold atoms? Where are the variants? If you insist, I will maintain that
each gold atom in your ring is built from 79 nucleons and 79 electrons,
but for each gold atom, one of its electrons wanders freely through
your ring. Now, with which electron does each gold atom form a gold
atom?
Chemistry, I think, doesn’t care, since chemistry doesn’t really count
gold-atoms, it measures how much gold there is.
I will not go down further on the path of speculating how we get
variants given various chemical substances. I take the model as an
inspiration for the semantics of mass nouns, rather than as a straitjacket
to fit chemistry into. A better picture of the semantics of prototypical
mass nouns is the following.
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Take a big juicy slab of meat. With Chierchia (1998), I think that we
can think of this as being built from minimal parts. Not natural meat-
parts, but minimal parts that are appropriately minimal in a context.
For instance, they are the pieces as small as a skilled butcher, or our
special finegrained meat-cutting machine can cut them. Suppose the
meat cutting machine consists of two sharp knife-lattices that cut the
meat from left to right, and then from front to back, snap-snap. This
will cut the meat into very many minimal meat pieces.
But if I move the knife-lattices slightly, the front-back knife to the
left, the left-right knife to the front, and cut snap-snap, I get a different
partition into minimal meat pieces. And of course, there are many
ways of moving the knives. All these partitions cut into pieces which, in
context, can count as minimal meat pieces. None of these partitions has
a privileged status, and none of these partitions provides its minimal
pieces with the privileged status of being the ’real’ minimal pieces. On
my view, all of these pieces count equally as minimal meat pieces in
the context given, and the meat is built from all of them.
Similarly for the case of driehoekjesbehang discussed above. We
gave one partition into minimal pieces of driehoekjesbehang above, but,
of course, there are many other such partitions. Since it is a partition,
each partition will consist of one square and some space. Since there
is enough space that needs to be divided up, many partitions exist, and
hence driehoekjesbehang is built from minimal pieces of driehoekjesbe-
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hang, many of which overlap.
In fact, I think this case is instructive as a model even for mass
nouns like water. When we think of partitioning a body of water, up to
water molecules, we may be inclined to regard the structure as consist-
ing of non-spatio-temporally realized Mickey Mouse molecules: And
the two minimal elements are two molecules. But the space between
the molecules is part of the body of water and shouldn’t be ignored.
Which means that here too we can argue that a minimal element in
the denotation of the mass noun water will be something that consists
of some essential structure (a Mickey Mouse) and some space. And
again, there are many ways of dividing the space, and hence, many
ways of partitioning the water into minimal mass-parts.
In sum: I propose that mass noun denotations are built from over-
lapping building blocks coming from a multiplicity of simultaneous
variants, different ways of dividing the stuff into minimal parts. Count
noun denotations, on the other hand, are built from building blocks
that are, or are made, non-overlapping, denotations that form a single
variant.
3. REGULAR SETS
We want to build a theory of mass and count noun denotations that
generalizes the standard Boolean semantics for count nouns to include
mass nouns, based on the idea that mass noun denotations are built
from simultaneous variants. In this, we want to stay as close to the
Boolean semantics as we can.
We start by spelling out a list of standard notions.
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We assume that the domain in which mass nouns and count nouns are
interpreted forms a complete atomic Boolean algebra BOOL=<BOOL,
⊑,¬,⊔,⊓, 0,1>.
Let X ⊆ BOOL.
∗X = {b ∈ BOOL: ∃Y ⊆ X:b = ⊔Y}
Let x,y ∈ BOOL–{0}
x and y are disjoint iff x ⊓ y=0
x and y overlap iff x ⊓ y 6=0
Let X ⊆ BOOL–{0} X is disjoint iff ∀x,y ∈ X: x and y are
disjoint
X overlaps iff X is not disjoint.
Two (non-zero) elements overlap if they have a non-zero part in com-
mon (x ⊓ y), otherwise they are disjoint. A set is disjoint if any two
elements in it are disjoint.
X is maximally disjoint in Y iff X is disjoint and X ⊆ Y and
for every Z ⊆ Y: if Z is disjoint and Z ⊇ X then X=Z
X is maximally disjoint in Y if X is a disjoint subset of Y and adding any
more elements of Y to X makes X overlap.
x is a minimal element of X iff x ∈ X–{0) and
for every y ∈ X–{0}: if y ⊑ x then y = x
min(X) is the set of minimal elements of X.
A generating set for X is a set gen(X) ⊆ X–{0} such that:
∀x ∈ X: ∃Y ⊆ gen(X): x = ⊔Y
Generating here means generating under complete sum.
If gen(X) is a generating set of X, then every element of X is generated
as the (complete) sum of elements in gen(X).
The following facts are important for our purposes:
-If 0 ∈ X, 0 is generated by any set gen(X), since generation is under
complete sum, ∅ is a subset of every set, and ⊔∅ = 0.
-If gen(X) is a generating set of X, then min(X) ⊆ gen(X). This is be-
cause generation is under sum, and gen(X) ⊆ X. Minimal elements
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in X can only be generated under ⊔ from gen(X) by being already in
gen(X).
-But sets can have more than one set of generators. If X is itself a
Boolean algebra, min(X) is a generating set for X, and hence so is any
set Y such that min(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X, including X itself.
So far all notions introduced are completely standard. We now use
these to introduce the notions we are after.
A generated set is a pair X = <X,gen(X)>, with gen(X) a
generating set for X.
In the theory to be developed, the denotations of lexical nouns are
going to be generated sets.
Standard notions are lifted to generated sets in the obvious way, For
instance:
Let X = <X,gen(X)>be a generated set
X is bounded iff X is bounded
X is bounded iff 0, ⊔X ∈ X
We now define the notion of a variant.
Let X = <X,gen(X)>be a bounded generated set.
V is a variant for X iff
1. V is a maximally disjoint subset of gen(X)
2. ∗V is a subset of X such that ⊔X ∈ ∗V
A variant for X is a maximally disjoint subset of gen(X) whose closure
generates elements of X, including the top element ⊔X.
The closure ∗V of variant V for X is a Boolean algebra with ⊔X as maxi-
mal element and V as the atoms. This means then that for each variant
V for X, ⊔X is generated as ⊔V.
X is generated by variants iff
1. For every x ∈ X there is some variant V for X such
that x ∈ ∗V




A generated set X is generated by variants if every element of X is
generated as the sum of atoms in some Boolean algebra ∗V, with V a
variant for X.
The second condition says that every disjoint subset can be extended
to a variant. This condition guarantees that if Y is a disjoint subset of
gen(X), then ⊔Y ∈ X.
Namely, by the second condition, Y is part of some variant V. This means
that ⊔Y ∈ ∗V, and hence, by the definition of variant, ⊔Y ∈ X.
We now define the notions of Boolean parts of b, X-parts of b, minimal
X-parts of b, X-generators of b:
Let b ∈ BOOL:
(b] = {y ∈ BOOL: y ⊑x} the Boolean part set of b
(also called the ideal generated by b.)
Let b ∈ X.
psX (b) = (b] ∩ X the X-part set of b is the intersection
of the Boolean part set of b with X
minX (b) = min(psX (b)) the set of minimal X-parts of b
Let X be a generated set, b ∈ X.
genX(b) = psX (b) ∩ gen(X) the set of generators of b in X is
the set of X-parts of b that are in
the set of generators for X.
psX(b) = <psX (b), genX(b)>the generated X-part set of b is the
pair consisting of the X-part set of b
and the set of generators of b in X.
With this, we define a notion that is a bit stronger than the notion of a
set generated by variants: a set closed under variants:
X is closed under variants iff for every b ∈ X: psX(b) is gen-
erated by variants.
So, if X is closed under variants it is not just X (= psX(⊔X)) that is
generated by variants, but the generated X-part set of every element in
X is as well.
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Next we introduce the notion of Boolean relative complement:
Let x,z ∈ BOOL and x ⊑ z
¬zx = ⊔{y ∈ (z]: x ⊓ y = 0} The relative complement of x in z is
the sum of all the Boolean parts of z
that do not overlap x.
Let X ⊆ BOOL
X is relatively complemented iff for every x and z in X:
if x ⊑ z then ¬zx ∈ X.
This means that for every b ∈ X, psX(b) is closed under relative com-
plement.
With these notions we define the notion of a regular set:
Let X be a bounded generated set.
X is regular iff X is closed under variants and X is relatively
complemented.
We impose the following interpretation constraint on lexical nouns:
Constraint on lexical nouns:
Mass nouns and count nouns denote regular sets.
(More precisely, plural count nouns denote regular sets. Singular count
nouns denote sets <V,V> such that <∗V,V> is a regular set.)
Fact 1: If B is a complete atomic Boolean algebra with
set of atoms ATOMB,
then B = <B,ATOMB> is a regular set.
Fact 2: Let S = NA ∪ CL be a disjoint subset of BOOL.
Let SALT = {b ∈ S: |min∗S(b) ∪ NA| = |min∗S(b) ∪ CL|}
(SALT is the set of those sums of NA and CL elements, that are
built from as many NA-elements as CL-elements.)
Then SALT = <SALT,min(SALT)> is a regular set.
Regular sets are meant to be generalizations of Boolean algebras that
stay as close to Boolean algebras as is possible.
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The idea is that the denotation of a count noun is generated from
a single variant, a set of non-overlapping elements. The mass noun de-
notation is a simultaneous multiplicity of such variants, each a Boolean
algebra which represents a different way of partitioning the same stuff
(i.e. with the same supremum). These Boolean algebras are scrambled
together into a regular set, collecting the variants together in one set
of generators. This means that the set of generators is going to contain
mutually overlapping elements, since the variants represent different
partitions of the same stuff.
The guiding intuition about the set of generators, gen(X), of regular
set X is that it is the set of semantic building blocks. And these are the
things that we would want to count as one.
4. THE BOOLEAN INTUITIONS
Regular sets generalize Boolean algebras. Regular sets are not always
Boolean algebras. The question is: if we move away from Boolean
algebras, aren’t we giving up on Boolean properties that motivated the
Boolean approach to the semantics of count nouns in the first place? I
will make a few remarks here.
1. Cumulativity.
If noun denotations are Boolean algebras, then they are cumulative,
closed under sum. The validity of cumulativity for mass nouns and
plural nouns has been a motivating principle for the Boolean approach:
-If x and y are salt. then x ⊔ y is salt.
-If x and y are horses, then x ⊔y are horses.
By moving to regular sets, it may seem that we are giving up on cumu-
lativity, since cumulativity is not valid for regular sets in general, be-
cause, unlike Boolean algebras, regular sets are not necessarily closed
under sum. Counterexamples can be found in the set SALT defined
above:
Let Na ∈ NA and Cl1, Cl2 ∈ CL.
Then Na ⊔ Cl1 ∈ SALT and Na ⊔ Cl2 ∈ SALT (since the amount of Na
and Cl is the same).
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However, (Na ⊔ Cl1) ⊔ (Na ⊔ Cl2) = Na ⊔ Cl1 ⊔ Cl2 /∈ SALT, since the
amount of Na and Cl is not the same.
The observation is: cumulativity is not valid for salt with overlap-
ping building blocks. To which I add: and it shouldn’t be!
Regular sets do satisfy the form of cumulativity that is intuitively valid
(cf. Krifka 1989):
-If x and y are salt and x and y are disjoint then x⊔y is salt.
Namely: if x, y ∈ SALT, and x ⊓ y = 0, then x is generated by a disjoint
subset Vx of gen(SALT) and y is generated by a disjoint subset Vy of
gen(SALT), and since x and y are disjoint, Vx ∪ Vy is disjoint.
Since SALT is a regular set, Vx ∪ Vy is part of a variant for SALT, and
hence
⊔(Vx ∪ Vy) ∈ SALT, which is x ⊔ y.
2. Remainder.
Noun denotations are closed under remainder:
-Take some, but not all of the salt away, there is something
left, and what is left is salt.
This principle, of course, stays valid for lexical nouns, because what
is left is the relative complement, and regular sets are closed under
relative complement.
What about complex noun phrases? Lønning (1987) assumes that
both nouns and adjectives denote Boolean part-of sets. Since (x] ∩ (y]
= (x ⊓ y], intersecting a noun with an adjective automatically gives
you a set which is itself a Boolean part set.
I am actually not following Lønning here even for count nouns: I
assume that a count noun is generated by a disjoint set, but I am not
requiring this set to be a set of atoms in BOOL (in this respect I am
following Krifka (1989), rather than Link (1983) or Landman (1989)).
But what about intersective adjectives? Shouldn’t they be Boolean?
The answer is that we need to look at the semantics in each particular
case, and if we do so, we can, I claim, get the right semantics with
regular sets.
For instance, look at the locative modifier in the shaker and the
noun phrase salt in the shaker. I think, with Lønning, that this noun
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phrase ought to denote a regular set.
But note that the semantics of locatives will tell us that if something is
in the shaker, its parts are in the shaker. And this means that it is not
difficult to make sure compositionally that salt in the shaker denotes
psSALT(b) for some b ∈ SALT: the salt-parts that are in the shaker (i.e.
salt-parts that are part of the sum of salt-parts that are in the shaker).
Since SALT is a regular set, psSALT(b) is also a regular set, so the
Lønning intuition is satisfied in this case.
But we don’t want the semantics to work like this in all cases. In
the count domain, numericals like at least three intersect with the noun
interpretation, but their interpretation is not Boolean, and the intersec-
tion is not either, and shouldn’t be.
Now think about adjectives in the mass domain, like yellow. If we
assume that yellow is a property that mass entities only acquire in some
bulk, then yellow is like at least three in the count domain, and we
shouldn’t expect the noun phrase to denote itself a regular set.
Let us assume that the salt is yellow: ⊔(SALT) ∈ SALT ∩ YELLOW.
Let us assume that yellow comes in bulk and that the single salt molecule
(NaCl) is not yellow:
(NaCL) ∈ SALT – YELLOW. We have a lot of salt, though, and the color
comes in bulk, so intuitively taking that one molecule away leaves us
with yellow salt:
⊔(SALT) – (NaCL) ∈ SALT ∩ YELLOW.
But this means that the denotation of yellow salt (on the bulk-
interpretation) is not a regular set, since it is not closed under relative
complement. And, I think, this is the way it should be: the case is com-
pletely parallel to that of at least three boys in the count domain, the
denotation of which is also not closed under relative complement.
The problem, then, is with Lønning’s identification of intersective
adjectives with Boolean adjectives, not with the generalization from
Boolean denotations to regular sets. We can do the semantics on regu-
lar sets just as well as we did on Boolean sets (and, in some cases, we
can do better).
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5. COUNTING GENERATORS
A regular noun intension maps every world onto a regular set. Lexi-
cal mass nouns and (plural) count nouns have regular intensions. For
noun intension N and world w, we write Nw for the regular set which
is the extension of N at w, where Nw = <Nw , gen(Nw)>.
We define a function COUNT which maps every regular noun in-
tension N and world w onto a relation between the elements of Nw
and natural numbers in N : formulae Count specifies different ways
of counting the elements of Nw , for noun intension N:
-The generators of Nw count as 1. -The count of b ∈ Nw is the arith-
metic sum of the count of its generating parts in Nw . -The count of b
∈ Nw is also the arithmetic sum of the count of its generating parts per
generating variant.
To this we add a correctness criterion for counting:
Correctness criterion: COUNT is correct on a regular noun
intension N iff
for every world w: Nw is a function from Nw into N
The idea is:
Count nouns have intensions on which COUNT is correct.
Mass nouns have intensions on which COUNT is incorrect.
The intensional definition takes care of borderline cases of mass de-
notations with 1 or 0 elements. It is obviously hard to distinguish an
empty mass denotation from an empty count denotation, and one may
ask why (15a) is felicitous, but (15b) is much less felicitous. I use
Dutch examples because in English the facts are muddled, because of































Similarly, we discussed above cases where the noun is mass, but its




(16) a. There is salt in the microscope, one molecule of salt.
b. #There is one salt in the microscope.
On the account of mass nouns developed here, what we can do with
two elements, we cannot do with one: two Na-ions and two Cl-ions
make two partitions of salt molecules, similarly two gold atoms and
two electrons. But one gold atom and two electrons give two combi-
nations, but not two combinations that partition into variants, since
the two elements overlap. In other words, such a set is not closed un-
der relative complement. (This problem was raised by Dafna Rothstein
Landman at the first presentation of this talk at the Palmyr conference,
and by Manfred Krifka at the Riga conference.)
On the analysis given, COUNT is incorrect for salt despite null and
singleton denotations: to be correct for a regular intension, COUNT
must be correct for the regular denotation of salt in each world, which,
of course, it isn’t (Krifka (1989) also defines count for noun intensions,
albeit for different reasons).
We look at two prototypical examples.
We assume that the count noun boys has an intension BOY which at
each world determines a regular set BOYw = <∗BOYw,BOYw>, where
BOYw is a disjoint subse5t of BOOL.
In the example the set of generators is: {sam, ben, max, bernard}.
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COUNTBOYw(sam ⊔ ben ⊔ max ⊔ bernard)
= Σ{COUNTBOYw(a): a ∈ genBOYw(sam ⊔ ben ⊔ max ⊔ bernard)}
= COUNTBOYw(sam) + COUNTBOYw(ben) + COUNTBOYw(max)
+ COUNTBOYw(bernard)
= 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 4
For every world w, gen(BOYw) forms a single variant for BOYw . Hence
we do not need to check condition 4 of COUNT independently.
This means that for every world w, COUNT is indeed a function on
BOYw , and COUNT is correct on BOY.
The mass noun salt is mapped onto an intension SALT which maps each
world w onto a regular set SALTw = <SALTw ,gen(SALTw)>. We take
the above structure as an example.
By the definition we gave above, SALTw is the set of elements that
contain equal amounts of Na and Cl:
SALTw = {0, Na ⊔ Cl, Na ⊔ Cl ,Na ⊔ Cl, Na ⊔ Cl , Na ⊔ Na
⊔ Cl ⊔ Cl }
We assume in this example that the set of generators equals the set of
minimal elements:
gen(SALTw) = { Na ⊔ Cl, Na ⊔ Cl ,Na ⊔ Cl, Na ⊔ Cl }
This set is built from two variants:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Mass Nouns 32
V1 = {Na ⊔ Cl, Na ⊔ Cl } (Na ⊔ Cl) ⊓ (Na ⊔ Cl ) = 0
V2 = {Na ⊔ Cl, Na ⊔ Cl } (Na ⊔ Cl) ⊓ (Na ⊔ Cl ) = 0
gen(SALTw) itself is not disjoint:
(Na ⊔ Cl) ⊓ (Na ⊔ Cl ) 6= 0 and (Na ⊔ Cl ) ⊓ (Na ⊔ Cl ) 6= 0
Hence the salt is built from building blocks that overlap.
Now we count:
COUNTSALTw(Na ⊔ Na ⊔ Cl ⊔ Cl ) =
= Σ{COUNTSALTw(a): a ∈ genSALTw(Na ⊔ Na ⊔ Cl ⊔ Cl )}
= COUNTSALTw(Na) + COUNTSALTw(Na ) + COUNTSALTw(Cl)
+ COUNTSALTw(Cl )
= 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 4
COUNTSALTw(Na ⊔ Na ⊔ Cl ⊔ Cl ) =
Σ{COUNTSALTw(y): y ∈ V1} = 2
COUNTSALTw(Na ⊔ Na ⊔ Cl ⊔ Cl ) =
Σ{COUNTSALTw(y): y ∈ V2} = 2
Hence, all in all:
COUNTSALTw(Na ⊔ Na ⊔ Cl ⊔ Cl ) = 4 and COUNTSALTw(Na ⊔ Na ⊔
Cl ⊔ Cl ) = 2
So, COUNT is not a function on SALTw, and COUNT is incorrect on
SALT.
6. COUNT AND MASS – NEAT AND MESS
We now take up the motivating idea concerning overlap and define
count nouns as nouns whose intension at every world specifies a reg-
ular set built from a set of non-overlapping generators, while mass
nouns are nouns whose intension at every world specifies a regular set
built from a set of non-overlapping generators (if the denotations are
big enough to allow this):
Let X be a function from worlds to regular sets.
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X is [+C], count, iff for every w: gen(Xw) is disjoint
i.e. the generators of Xw do not overlap
X is [–C], mass, iff for every w: if |Xw |>1 then gen(Xw) is not
disjoint,
i.e. the generators of Xw overlap.
While defined for intensions, we will freely use these features for the
structures Xw themselves, and call these structures count and mass.
This definition in principle allows nouns that are neither mass nor
count. I don’t assume that lexical nouns can be specified that way.
While I could have defined [–C] as the complement of [+C], the defi-
nition given presents mass and count more strongly as different seman-
tic perspectives: always overlapping generators versus always disjoint
generators.
Interestingly enough, the theory of regular sets allows a second kind
of mass structure, which is mass, but in several ways closer to count.
For this, we introduce the following opposition:
X is [+N], neat, iff for every w: min(Xw) is disjoint
i.e. the minimal elements of Xw do not overlap
X is [–N], mess, iff for every w: if |Xw |>1 then min(Xw) is not
disjoint,
i.e. the minimal elements of Xw overlap.
On this definition, neat nouns are nouns whose intension at every
world specifies a regular set whose set of minimal elements is non-
overlapping, while mess nouns are nouns whose intension at every
world specifies a regular set whose set of minimal elements is over-
lapping (again, if the denotations are big enough to allow this).
By definition, count entails neat: [–N]⇒ [–C]
Equivalently, mess entails mass: [+C]⇒ [+N]
The mass structure for salt given in the previous section is a structure
that is mess mass [–C, –N]. Its set of generators overlap ([–C]), and
since the set of generators is the set of minimal elements, its set of
minimal elements overlap ([–N]).
But the theory allows structures that are neat mass: [–C, +N].
These are structures in which the set of generators overlaps, but the
set of minimal elements does not.
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I propose that these structures are precisely suited for mass nouns
like furniture and kitchenware:
In this structure, the set of generators includes more than just the min-
imal elements. The building blocks are what we intuitively want to
count as one. Thus, in this structure singularities and pluralities are
counted as one simultaneously, without making sure that they do not
overlap.
The difference with count is that for count nouns a plurality of
boys does not itself count as one boy. But a plurality of kitchenware,
like the cup and saucer, can count itself as kitchenware, and can also
count as one. For instance, it counts as one on an inventory listing
where everything that is sold as one item has its own price.
Rothstein (2010) discusses count nouns like line, highway, mirror:
objects in the denotation of these nouns typically have objects as parts
that themselves can be in the denotation of these nouns: a line divides
into lines, a highway into highways, a mirror breaks into mirrors.
But before the mirror breaks, we do not, in a normal context, count
the mirror and its parts that would count as mirrors when broken as
more than one: only the maximal mirror counts. Thus the mirrors that
we do count don’t overlap, or we make them not overlap by packaging.
Neat mass denotations are different: the teapot, the cup, the saucer,
the cup and saucer all count as kitchenware and can all count as one
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simultaneously in the same context.
Neat mass nouns differ from mess mass nouns like salt and meat, in
that the minimal building blocks of neat nouns are non-overlapping:
the minimal building blocks of meubilair, furniture, are the meubels,
the pieces of furniture. The generating set of furniture overlaps, but the
overlap is only vertical: a sum and its parts count as one simultaneously.
In other words: the denotations of neat nouns are sets in which the
distinction between singular individuals and plural individuals is not
properly articulated.
In context, the denotation of furniture may be equated with its set
of generators. Then we would get the following denotations:
(17) meubel −→ <MEUBEL, MEUBEL> with MEUBEL a
disjoint set
meubels −→ <∗MEUBEL, MEUBEL>
meubilair−→ <∗MEUBEL, ∗MEUBEL>
We see that this is in fact very close to what I proposed as a reasonable
version of the theory of Chierchia 1998, except, of course, that I add
here an interpretation to these pairs, that fits them naturally into the
theory of mass nouns I am developing here. Hence, the reason why
you cannot count neat nouns is not the reason that Chierchia gives.
The reason is that counting goes wrong.
In the above example,gen(KITCHENWAREw) =
{ the teapot, the cup, the saucer, the pan, the cup
and saucer, the teaset }
We calculate the count for the teaset:
- COUNTKITCHENWAREw(the teaset) = 1
because the teaset ∈ gen(KITCHENWAREw)
Generators count as 1.
- COUNTKITCHENWAREw(the teaset) = 5
because the teaset = the teaset ⊔ the teapot ⊔ the cup ⊔ the saucer,
and the teaset, the teapot, the cup, the saucer ∈ gen(KITCHENWAREw)




- COUNTKITCHENWAREw(the teaset) = 2
because the teaset = the teapot ⊔ the cup and saucer, and
the teapot, the cup and saucer ∈ gen(KITCHENWAREw)
Here we count relative to the variant: {the teapot, the cup and saucer}.
- COUNTKITCHENWAREw(the teaset) = 3
because the teapot ⊔ the cup ⊔ the saucer, and
the teapot, the cup, the saucer ∈ gen(KITCHENWAREw)
Here we count relative to the variant: {the teapot, the cup, the saucer}.
Clearly, then, COUNT is incorrect, and kitchenware is mass. It is
neat mass, because the minimal elements are neatly disjoint.
7. INDIVIDUATED SETS AND THE TWO FEATURE SYSTEM
Rothstein (2010) assumes that the mass nouns furniture and kitchen-
ware are like the count nouns boys and peas in that their sets of minimal
elements are individuated or naturally atomic. The following is an at-
tempt at (partially) formalizing this notion.
Let X be a regular noun intension and D be a set of natu-
ralistic properties, like properties of Form, square, round,..;
properties of Size, big, small,..; properties of Weight, heavy,
light,..; properties of Color, red, green,.. etc. . .
A subset of D is a dimension set for X, DX , if DX consists of
properties of which it is natural (in every salient world w)
for the generators of Xw , the elements of gen(Xw), to have
them.
By this we mean that the generators of Xw are the kind of things that
we distinguish in terms of whether they are big or small, red or green,
etc. . .
X is individuated by dimension set DX if each property in DX
is a bipartition on gen(Xw), and the properties in DX jointly
determine the partition into singletons: {{x}: x ∈ gen(Xw)}
(for every salient world w, and non-trivial regular set Xw).
The idea is that DX consists of natural properties, and enough of them,
to tell the generators apart. Individuation is not counting: you can in-
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dividuate the generators of a noun denotation in w with natural prop-
erties, partition them into finegrained natural units down to the level
of singletons, without ending up with non-overlapping objects.
But counting is itself individuation: we assume that generators that
are made non-overlapping in context (i.e. count) are ipse facto individ-
uated.
We give this the following form:
The extensional dimension set EX w is:
EX w = { λx ∈ gen(Xw): ∀y ∈ gen(Xw)–{x}: x ⊓ y = 0 }
The set consisting of the property that a generator has if
it is disjoint from all other generators.
-Noun intension X is [+I], individuated, iff there is a salient
dimension DX which for every world w individuates Xw
(if Xw is non-trivial).
-We assume that EX, the extensional dimension set, is always salient.
We let X be [–I], non-individuated, if X is not individuated.
On this formalization, Xw is individuated by EX iff X is count, and
hence count entails individuated: [+C]⇒ [+I]
We have now three features: [±C], [±N] and [±I].
I will adopt a Two Feature System in which the structural notion neat
(no overlapping minimal elements) and the more intensional notion
individuated are taken to coincide:
Strong Mess Mass assumption: [+N]⇔ [+I]
This is a constraint on noun intensions: we restrict the noun intensions
available for the interpretation of natural language to those that sat-
isfy the equivalence [+N]⇔ [+I]. This makes no difference for count
nouns, which are by definition neat and extensionally individuated,
but the constraint says that when a mass noun has a neat denotation,
its generators are interpreted as individuated by a salient (intensional)
dimension set, and it says that when a mass noun has a mess inter-




The Two Feature System gives the following set of features, which
we assume to be lexically specified on nouns in English:
[+C, +N] = [+C] count: boys, peas
[–C,–N] = [–C, –N] mess mass: meat, cheese
[–C,+N] = [–C, +N] neat mass: furniture, kitchenware
The theory makes the following natural distinctions:
And the hypothesis is that these contrasts are semantically robust, mean-
ing that natural languages will cluster properties around these two
boundaries, both within one language and cross-linguistically.
For the feature [±C] this is, of course, well attested in the literature.
See for example the following table:
[–C] [+C]
1. Plural: salt #salts boy Øboys
furniture #furnitures
2. Numericals #one salt #two salt Øone boy Øtwo boys
#one furniture #two furniture
3. Quantifiers: #every meat Øevery boy
#many meat #many furniture Ømany boys
Ømuch meat Ømuch furniture #much boy #much boys
8. THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE FEATURE [±N]
In this section I discuss four phenomena which show that the feature
[±] is semantically robust.
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8.1. The classifier stuks in Dutch.
Dutch has a classifier stuks with a meaning similar to the English head
(as in head of cattle) but with a much wider use. Doetjes (1997) ob-
serves that stuks applies to count nouns and to neat mass nouns, but































































































































(21) Checking a sorted order list from an online Department store:
U heeft drie stuks meubilair, zes stuks keukenwaar, twaalf
You have three items furniture, six items kitchenware, twelve
stuks fijne vleeswaren, en zes stuks sport artikelen aangekruist.
items cold cuts and six items sports-products checked.

















































A caveat: as one can easily find out by searching the internet, workers
in the catering branch do not, in their internet exchanges, distinguish
very carefully between the classifier stuks (items) and the plural noun
stukken (pieces). This means that they produce data which contradicts
the data in (20):
(23) a. Een bitter garnituur bestaat uit zes stuks worst, zes stuks
kaas en zes stuks bitterballen.
A meat roll dish consists of six items sausage, six items
cheese and six items meat rolls
This may be a linguistic innovation or sloppiness. Both for Doetjes, for
me and my informants, (23a) is ungrammatical; its content should be
expressed as (23b):
(23) b. Een bitter garnituur bestaat uit zes stukjes worst, zes stuk-
jes kaas en zes stuks bitterballen.
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A meat roll dish consists of six pieces sausage, six pieces
cheese and six items meat rolls
I will ignore the internet innovation here.
The classifier stuks takes neat nouns denotations as input and turns
them into count noun denotations. How does it do this?
That depends on the semantics of the input noun. All neat nouns
are individuated, but some are more individuated than others. Vee is a
mass noun in Dutch, while cattle is a plural noun in English. There is
no doubt, however, either in Dutch or in English, which elements count
as the most elementary building blocks of vee: the heads of cattle. In
this, vee is like prototypical count nouns.
[Vee means domesticated farm animals, live-stock, typically cows,
sheep, goats, but also chickens (pluimvee/feathered live-stock). How-
ever, out of the blue, vee means cattle (and that’s the only thing my
pocket dictionary Dutch-English gives). Below, I will, for ease, trans-
late vee as cattle, except where I explicitly mean live-stock.]
Rothstein (2010) uses the term inherently atomic for prototypical
count nouns, to distinguish them from count nouns like fence. For
inherently atomic neat mass nouns, the interpretation of stuks is the
following:
Let X be an inherently atomic neat noun intension. For
every world w:
stuks(Xw) = <∗(min(Xw)),min(Xw))>
Stuks vee has the same denotation as the count noun phrase domesti-
cated farm animals.
Neat nouns like kitchenware are less inherently atomic, in the sense
that we saw above: in context, it is not automatically obvious whether
something is meant to count as three or as one. In this case, we can
assume that different choices are possible:
For regular set X, let VX be the set of all variants in X.
Let X be a neat noun intension which is not inherently
atomic.
In context k, let stuksk be a function which maps X and
world w onto a set
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stuksk,X,w ∈ VX w , a variant for Xw .
We define, for context k and world w:
stuksk(Xw) = <∗stuksk,X,w , stuksk,X,w>
In context k, we choose a variant of the generators of kitchenware, say,
the pan, the teapot, and the cup and saucer, and let stuks keukenwaar
denote the closure under sum of that set.
For inventory list counting contexts, we may want to count all the
generators, not just a variant. In that case, we have to make the gen-
erators disjoint:
Let ↑ (X) = {↑(x): x ∈ X}, with ↑ the packaging operation defined in
section 9 below.
Let X be a neat noun intension which is not inherently atomic. Let i be
an inventory context.
stuksi(Xw) = <∗ ↑(gen(X)), ↑(gen(X))>
This will package the generators that are pluralities as count atoms.
In all these cases, the resulting noun phrase is a count noun phrase,
and COUNT is correct on its denotation.
8.2. Counting in Chinese.
The Dutch classifier stuks is very similar to Chinese individual classi-
fiers, like the general individual classifier ge.
We follow Chierchia (1998) and Li (1983) in assuming that seman-
tically all lexical nouns in Chinese are [–C]. We assume that numericals
in Chinese, like numericals in English, require noun denotations as in-
put that are [+C]. It follows from this, that numericals cannot combine
with lexical nouns in Chinese:
(24) #Liăng níu #Liăng ròu
two cow two meat
We assume that the Chinese nouns that correspond to English proto-
typical count nouns are neat nouns, [+N], in Chinese. And we assume
that ge is much like stuks in Dutch, in that it maps [+N] nouns onto
noun phrases that are count.
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
43 Fred Landman
The difference with Dutch, then, is that the class of [–C,+N] nouns
in Chinese is much larger, and, by necessity, the classifier construction
is fully productive. For most of these nouns, the first interpretation
strategy given for stuks above—mapping the neat noun interpretation
on the closure of its set of minimal elements—will be appropriate for
Chinese ge as well.
Since ge requires a neat noun as input, we find the contrast in (25):
(25) a. ròu [–N] níu [+N]
meat cow
b. #Liăng ge ròu ØLiăng ge níu
two CL [meat[−N]] two [CL cow[+N]]
8.3. Distributive adjectives.
Rothstein (2009b) and Rothstein (2010) discuss distributive adjectives,
adjectives that have distributive interpretations and resist collective in-
terpretations (I see no reason to call them ‘stubbornly distributive’ as
Schwarzschild does: in my usage ‘not distributive’ means ’not neces-
sarily distributive’ (since any predicate can be made to distribute)).
Distributive: Small, big, large, round, square,. . .
Not distributive: noisy, successful,. . .
(26) a. The boys are noisy/successful
b. The boys are small/big
(26a) can mean that the individual boys are noisy/successful, but also
that the boys are noisy/successful as a group. (26b) only means that
the individual boys are small/big, not that the boys are small/big as a
group.
Schwarzschild and Rothstein (independently) observe that distribu-
tive adjectives modify neat mass nouns like furniture and kitchenware
in the same way as they modify count nouns, while mess mass nouns
pattern differently:
(27) a. The furniture is big.
b. The big furniture is exhibited on the third floor.
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(28) a. The meat is big.
b. The big meat is in the other fridge.
For furniture in (27) we find exactly what we found for count nouns:
(27a) expresses that the furniture generators, the pieces of furniture,
are big. The big furniture in (27b) consists of the pieces of furniture
that are individually big, like the sofa’s and the pianola’s.
This reading is absent for mess mass nouns like meat in (28): (28a)
does not mean that the meat-generators are big; (28b) does not mean
that all big meat-generators are in the other fridge. (28a) means that
the meat comes in the form of a big hunk, while (28b) means that the
meat that is packaged in big hunks is in the other fridge. Big clearly
does not distribute to the meat-generators: in the contexts of our meat-
cutting machine, the generators are all small. The small-big distinction
is not a salient individuating dimension on meat generators, and in
fact, applying distributive adjectives to mess mass nouns is, out of con-
text, often not fully felicitous. The distributive adjectives are typically
the ones that are naturally used as part of individuating dimension sets.
The question is: how do distributive adjectives distribute in the
neat mass domain? In the count domain, the distributive operator is
standardly regarded as a null version of the adverbial each. Now that
we discover that there is distributivity in the (neat) mass domain, ques-
tions are raised about the connection between distributivity and each,
because, of course, each cannot apply to mass nouns (#each furniture).
I propose that the connection with each is not given up. I assume
that the distributive operator on neat noun denotations semantically
shifts the neat noun denotation X to count interpretation stuksk(X),
and distributes on the latter as usual:
Let X be a neat noun intension, for every world w and con-
text k:
big = λXw . <∗(gen(stuksk(Xw)) ∩ big), gen(Xw) ∩ ∗
(gen(stuksk(Xw)) ∩ big)>
Note that the shift takes place as part of the meaning of big: we are not
shifting the mass noun to a count noun. And, in fact, we assume that
the result of applying big to X is a neat mass noun: the new set of gen-
erators is gen(Xw) ∩∗(gen(stuksk(Xw)) ∩ big), the set of X generators
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that are sums of big stuks N, not simply the set of minimal elements
gen(stuksk(Xw)) ∩ big. (In fact, we can make it a requirement on fe-
licitous application of big to X, that the result stay neat mass.) Hence
for neat mass noun N, big N is a neat mass noun phrase, not a count
noun phrase. But big distributes to the generators that count as ‘stuks’.
For inherently atomic neat mass nouns like vee in Dutch, this means
that in groot vee (big cattle), groot distributes to stuks vee, the minimal
elements, the individual heads of cattle. This is as it should be.
For less inherently atomic neat nouns like kitchenware, we expect
that big need not distribute to the minimal elements, like it does in
vee: big distributes to stuks of kitchenware, but what counts as stuks of
kitchenware is context dependent. Thus, the teapot, the pan, and the
cup and saucer may all count as big, even though the cup itself and
the saucer itself don’t. Hence the distribution of big is predicted to be
contextual in exactly the way that the interpretation of stuks (in Dutch)
is contextual.
For the inventory reading, a bit more work will have to be done
concerning the set of generators (because it is not necessarily a sub-
set of gen(Xw)). It is reasonable to assume it to be at least (gen(X)
∪ ↑(gen(X)) ∪ big. Here too we can make it a requirement that the
interpretation of the complex stays neat mass.
In sum, big is distributive on neat nouns through classifier stuksk.
This predicts that distributive adjectives treat inherently atomic neat
nouns the same as count nouns (distribution to minimal elements), but
other neat nouns show the distribution expected from their possible
stuksk interpretations.
8.4. Neat comparison.
Barner & Snedeker (2005) present experimental data to show that
for children and adults neat nouns pattern with count nouns, when
it comes to size comparisons: both compare in terms of cardinality. We
expand upon this result in this section.
Barner and Snedeker’s results have direct linguistic consequences
for the semantics of most, which involved comparison. We give the
examples in Dutch, because this will allow us to use the neat mass
noun vee (cattle).
We look at available readings for de meeste (most).
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[Note Dutch de meeste is ambiguous between most and the superla-
tive the most. For the examples below, a superlative reading is hard to












































Vlees/meat is a mess mass noun and the measure involved is a mass
measure:
more = more in volume/more in weight. . . . etc.
The reading which is unavailable is a counting reading, i.e.
more = more in number of generators, more in number of
minimal generators.
The reason is clear: if you were to count generators or minimal gen-




































In this case, the only reading available is the counting reading:
more = more in number of generators = more in number
of minimal elements.






































We look at neat nouns: (32a) means (32b):


































Barner and Snedeker’s results show that the most prominent interpre-
tation of the comparative in (32b) is similar to that of the comparative
in (31b). Hence, the most prominent reading available for (32) is the
counting reading:
more = more in stuks = number of minimal elements.
I say ‘the most prominent reading.’ Let me be more precise: I think that
the only counting reading available for (32) is the reading on which it is
equivalent to (31), and hence counting is in terms of minimal elements.
But this is for ‘inherently atomic’ neat mass nouns. For less inher-
ently atomic neat mass nouns, the most prominent comparison is also
in terms of counting generators, but in that case, this need not be nec-
essarily minimal generators.






































In this shop, the teapot is 6 euros, the cup and saucer is 4.50, and the
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pan is 12 euros. You cannot buy the cup separately, nor the saucer, and
the teaset is just the teapot and the cup and saucer, no price differences
there. Two items cost more than 5 euros, one item less, hence (33) is
true.
more = more in stuksk: not more in minimal generators, but in the
choice of generators determined by stuksk
Situation 2:
In the neighbouring shop, the cup is 3 euros, the saucer is 3 euros, you
pay 5.50 for the cup and saucer, the teapot is 6 euros, the teaset is 11
euros.
In this shop, three items cost more than 5 euros, and 2 items less, (33)
is true.
more = more in stuksi, where i is an inventory context: more is more
in terms of the whole set of generators, counting each generator inde-
pendently as one.
We see that, as in the previous case of distribution, the comparison in
the neat noun is in terms of stuksk. This gives the following semantics:
Let X be a neat noun intension [+N]. For every world w
and context k:
MOSTstuks(Xw , P) = 1 iff |gen(stuksk(Xw)) ∩ P| >
|gen(stuksk(Xw)) – P|
For count nouns, gen(stuks(COWw)) = COWw , hence:
MOSTstuks(COWw , OUTSIDEw) = 1 iff |COWw ∩ OUTSIDEw | >
|COWw – OUTSIDEw |
For inherently atomic neat noun vee, let us assume than in the context
of our farm, the vee/live-stock consists of cows and chickens.
gen(stuks(VEE))= COW ∪ CHICKEN. Let us set FA= COW ∪ CHICKEN.
Then:
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MOSTstuks(VEEw , OUTSIDEw) = 1 iff |FA OUTSIDE| >
|FA – OUTSIDE|
I said above that the counting reading in terms of stuks is the most
prominent reading of neat mass nouns. I also said that for inherently
atomic neat nouns it is the only counting reading. But it is not the only
reading. This is a major reason why I am unhappy with Chierchia’s
(2010) classification of neat mass nouns as ‘fake’ mass nouns. Because
neat mass nouns are not fake mass nouns, they are real mass nouns,
and the evidence is that most can compare neat mass nouns in terms
of the measures that are appropriate for mess mass nouns.
Suppose that there are cows and chickens, and the cows are kept
outside, but the chickens are kept inside. The chickens outnumber the
cows, but in terms of biomass and volume, there is less biomass and













































































The examples in (35) are infelicitous, or rather, it isn’t clear what the
biomass/volume adjunct has to do with the rest of the sentence, be-




But this is not true in the examples in (34). In terms of cardinality,
most farm animals are not kept outside, because there are more chick-
ens than cows, and the chickens, unfortunately, are inside. Still, (34)
is true, because the comparison can be in terms of biomass or volume.
Compare also (36) in English:
(36) a. In terms of volume, most live-stock is cattle.
b. #In terms of volume, most farm animals are cattle.
(36b) is funny, and in as much as it is felicitous it is false in the above
scenario. (36a), on the other hand, is true.
We see, then, that the facts are in line with what Barner and
Snedeker’s experiments show, but they are more subtle. Counting com-
parison for neat nouns, like distributivity, is in terms of stuksk, hence
counting comparison for neat nouns is only strictly identified with
counting minimal generators for inherently atomic neat mass nouns.
The counting comparison is more flexible and context dependent for
less inherently atomic neat mass nouns.
Moreover, neat mass nouns are true mass nouns in that mass mea-
sure interpretations are available for most NOUN, if the noun is a neat
mass noun; this is a real difference with count nouns: mass measure
interpretations are completely unavailable for most NOUN if the noun
is a count noun.
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9. FUSION AND FISSION
I assume that packaging as an operation from mass entities to count en-
tities is the same operation as group formation (as assumed in Landman
1991): a mass or count sum is treated as a count atom, more than the
sum of its parts. But bringing in packages and groups simultaneously is
more complex than I am willing to deal with here. So I deal only with
packaging, and assume the following picture:
-The generator sets of mass predicates are subsets of the domain M.
-C = M ∪ IND.
-The generator sets of count predicates are disjoint subsets of C.
In honor of the fact that I assume one operation for packaging and
group formation, I will give it a new name, and since the operation
fuses a plurality into an atom, I will call it fusion:
Fusion: ↑: M–ATOMM → IND is a one-one function into IND
Fusion is an injection from M-sums into atomic packages.
↑: ATOMM → ATOMM = {<a,a>: a ∈ ATOMM}
Fusion is identity on M-atoms
Not every element of IND needs to be in ran(↑), the range of ↑. If fido
is in IND, fido is not only more than the sum of his mass parts, but also
more than the fusion of his mass parts. But there is an equivalence
relation relating fido uniquely to the fusion of his mass parts:
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≈ is an equivalence relation on IND such that:
for every a ∈ IND there is exactly one b ∈ IND such that
b ≈ a and b ∈ ran(↑).
For a ∈ IND, we let a≈ be the unique element of [a]≈ such
that a≈ ∈ ran(↑).
This equivalence relation is used to relate fido to the sum of his M-parts.
Besides fusion, we have an operation that splits an IND atom into
a plurality of M-elements, maps a set onto the sum of its splits, and a
regular mass or count set onto the sum of the splits of its generators:
Split: ↓o: C→ M defined by:
↓o(b) = b if b ∈ M
↓o(b) = ↑
−1(b≈) if b ∈ IND
↓o(X) = ⊔({↓o(x): x ∈ X})if X ⊆ C
↓o(X) = ↓o(gen(X)) if X = <X,gen(X)> is a regular mass
or count set
In terms of split, we define an operation of fission:
Fission: ↓
↓(b) = (↓o(b)] if b ∈ C
↓(X) = (↓o(X)] if X ⊆ C
↓(X) <↓o(X)],↓o(X)]–{0}> if X = <X,gen(X)> is a regular mass
or count set
If fido is in IND, then the split of fido is the sum of fido’s M-parts, and
the fission of fido is the set of all Boolean parts of the split of fido:
(↓o(FIDO)]
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Suppose the individual dogs are d1, d2 and d2 ∈ IND. Then:
DOG = <∗{d1, d2, d3}, {d1, d2, d3}>.




For each dog di , go to the package of di ’s sum of M-parts, and go back
to the corresponding sum of M-parts. Sum these parts together: that is
the split of gen(DOG).
The fission of DOG, ↓(DOG), is the set of all Boolean parts of that
split, and the fission of DOG, ↓(DOG), is the regular set consisting of
↓(DOG) and ↓(DOG)–{0} as set of generators.
10. FISSION READINGS
(37) a. There is human in this dish.
b. There is cat in this soup.
c. There was dog all over the wall.
The cases in (37) are examples of grinding, which we have rebaptized
fission: in all these cases a [+C] noun is given a [–C] interpretation.
Rothstein (2009a) provides cross-linguistic evidence that fission of




Rothstein’s account for the English cases in (37) is as follows:
-The singular copula in (37) is followed by a bare noun and requires
number agreement. There are no bare singular nouns in English, only
bare mass nouns. The bare nouns human, cat and dog are lexically
count. This is a grammatical conflict.
This conflict is resolved by fission: NOUN[+C]⇒↓(NOUN) [–C]
Cheng et al. (2008) point out that in Chinese, (38), which corre-
sponds to (37c), does not have a fission reading, but only a plural, wall-










There is dog all over the wall.
Rothstein’s account for Chinese is as follows:
Chinese nouns are not specified for number, there is no number agree-
ment between the copula and the noun, so the bare noun is grammati-
cal in (38) and allows a plural interpretation. On the assumption that
fission is a last-resort mechanism, it follows that (38) does not have a
fission interpretation.
Rothstein (2009a) argues that in Hebrew, as in Chinese, fission
readings are not possible, but they can be triggered by a mismatch
in grammatical gender between the copula and the post-copular bare
noun.
Cheng et al. (2008) point out that natural foodstuff nouns in Chi-


















There is apple in the salad.
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(39a) is like (38): (39a) can only be interpreted as expressing that
there is a whole pig in the salad, i.e. a plate with a pig (presumably
with an apple in its mouth) dressed up with lettuce leaves and other
salad goods, covered in thousand island dressing.
On the other hand, (39b) can mean what the English paraphrase
means: the salad has apple in it, and it doesn’t have to be a whole
apple, it can be apple pieces, grated apple, etc. . .
There is a natural account for the facts in (39), namely that food-
stuff nouns like píngguŏ (apple) in Chinese are ambiguous between a
[+N] reading (what hangs from the tree) and a [–N] reading (what is
eaten in apple sauce). On that assumption, the mass reading we ob-
serve for foodstuff nouns is not a fission reading, but an authentic mess
mass reading.
I want to propose something stronger here, namely, that foodstuff
nouns are ambiguous, not only in Chinese, but in English and Dutch as
well.
Ambiguity Assumption:
[–N] [+N, –C] [+C]
English: meat dog
apple apple
Chinese: ròu (meat) gŏu (dog)
píngguŏ (apple) píngguŏ(apple)
With Rothstein’s last resort assumption for fission readings, this pre-
dicts that food-stuff nouns have a mess mass reading in all three lan-
guages, but no fission reading.
What is the difference?
In section 1 of this paper, I argued against homeopathic semantics
for mess mass nouns like salt and triangle patterned wallpaper: mess
mass nouns, I argued, do not have a homeopathic interpretation, there
are lexical and contextual constraints on what counts as salt and on
when the salt is becoming too small to be split into two parts that both
count as salt.
On the other hand, in the previous section I gave a semantics for
the fission interpretation of dog: ↓(DOG) = <(↓(DOG)], (↓(DOG)]–
{0}>, the set of all Boolean parts of the split of the set of all individual
dogs. This means that the fission interpretation of dog is homeopathic,
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in that it doesn’t put constraints on what counts as fission dog, more
than that it is mass part of the sum of all dogs.
The prediction, then, is that fission readings are homeopathic, closed
under arbitrary mass parts. For fission readings, like those in (37a,b)
repeated here, what there has to be in the dish/soup to make the state-
ment true can be manipulated in context to an extreme degree:
(40) a. There is human in this dish.
b. There is cat in this soup.
∃x[ x ⊑↓o(CAT) ∧ in the soup(x)]
Thus, normally you will utter (37a,b) if you detect human flesh in the
dish or cat flesh in the soup. But I may say (37b) with disapproval if I
find a piece of fingernail in the dish, or fish a cat hair out of my soup.
In a mythological context, if I, to test the Wisdom of the Gods, take
something from the body of Pelops, so small that we ordinary humans
would not be able to detect it, still in the Myth, Zeus will thunder at
me: there is human in this dish, and condemn me to the Tartarus.
Thus, in context, certain parts may be regarded as too small to be
considered as parts that matter, but the context can be manipulated
(as in the Zeus example) to include arbitrarily small parts. And the
flexibility here can be extreme.
Suppose Harold comes into the kitchen, proudly shows us the gall
stone they have removed from him, and drops it by accident in the
soup. You fish it out and I say:
(41) I am not going to eat that soup, it has had Harold in it.
This is, of course, funny, but so are all the other fission examples, and
the thing that gets stretched in this example is: ’what counts as a con-
textually relevant part of Harold. Lexical mass nouns are not homeo-
pathic. In order for (41) to be true, there has to be meat in the soup
and not just something that is part of the meat.
(41) There is meat in the soup.
For instance, in the near future white calf-meat may come on the
market that consists 70% of hormones. Suppose I extract the hormones
from calf-meat, put them in a jar, and make a soup for the yearly dinner
party of the Body-builders Club, and I scoop a considerable amount of
these hormones into the soup.
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The vegetarians among the body-builders may regard the soup as
not suited for them, because not only do they not eat meat, but they
also try not to eat additives for the production of which animals have
been killed. Yet, this doesn’t mean that (41) is true. For (41) to be
true there has to be meat in the soup, and not just a set of chemicals
derived from a meat source.
The difference between these two cases is instructive. The lexical
mass nouns, by their meaning, put constraints on their denotation: if
something is in the denotation of meat, only those of its parts are in
the denotation of meat that themselves satisfy the criteria for counting
as meat.
Fission interpretations, as we have seen, are different: there are no
other lexical constraints for being in the denotation of the fission of
dog than being part of the split of dogs, and contextual salience. This
shows that if you think (which I don’t) that count nouns like dog have
mess mass interpretations, or interpretations unspecified for count and
mass, like Pelletier’s interpretations, or Rothstein’s root-noun interpre-
tations, these interpretations are different from fission interpretations.
The reason for this is that a mess mass interpretation or root interpre-
tation would put semantic constraints on the noun denotation, lexical
constraints, and that is just what we don’t find for fission interpreta-
tions.
We now look at (42):
(42) There is apple in the salad.
Again, genetically modified apples may come on the market that con-
sist 70% of hormones, the same hormones as contained in the calf-
meat. At the same dinner, I mix the apple-derived hormones into the
salad. Just as (41) is not true, (42) is not true. For (42) to be true, it
is not enough that there is part of the apples in the salad, it has to be
part that itself counts as apple.
Thus, apple patterns with mess mass nouns like meat, suggesting
strongly that also in English, foodstuff nouns like apple are ambiguous
between a count interpretation and a mess mass interpretation.



















































The examples in (43) are felicitous, those in (44) are not. Why would
this be?
Let us make the following assumption:
Assumption: the modified nouns small N, big N derive their
fission behavior from the head noun.
With this, we argue as follows. Small dog and big dog are count noun
phrases in a context where dog can only have a fission interpretation.
By the assumption made above, big dog and small dog can also have
a fission interpretation: the fission of small dog is the set of Boolean
parts of the split of small dogs. This means that what (43a) and (43b)
express is similar to:
(45) a. There is Chihuahua in the salad
b. There is Doberman in the salad.
We come to (44). Apple and carrot do not have a fission interpretation,
they have a count interpretation and a mess mass interpretation. By
the assumption made above, big apple and big carrot do not have a
fission interpretation either.
But this means that big apple and big carrot in (44) can only be
analyzed as:
[big [apple[−N]]] and [big [carrot[−N]]]. But we know that distributive
adjectives like big are not very felicitous with mess mass nouns, and
this is why the cases in (44) are not good.
Note crucially that the reading we saw for the cases in (43) is
patently absent for the cases in (44). Dutch winter wortels (winter-
carrots) are huge. The noun winter wortel itself is like carrot in that it
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is food stuff that allows both a count and a mess mass reading. We find

























If I grate a winter-carrot and put the result in the salad, (46b) is per-
fectly felicitous, but (46a) is terrible: (46a) just cannot mean that there
is stuff derived from the split of big carrots in the salad.
This strongly supports the distinctions made here and argues
strongly against theories in which fission is a simple operation lifting
the count nature of the noun, semantically doing not much more than
removing a bit of contextual restriction. On such a theory, there is no
rationale whatsoever for the contrast between (46a) and (46b).
11. THE NEATNESS OF FISSION READINGS
11.1. The problem.
The fission interpretation of count nouns like dog as ↓(DOG) has a
problem, as can be observed in the picture in section 9: ↓(DOG) is
mass all right, but it is also neat. The reason is that BOOL is a com-
plete atomic Boolean algebra, and ↓(DOG) is closed downwards, hence
min(↓(DOG)) = atom(↓(DOG)), and hence min(↓(DOG)) is disjoint.
Now we have been assuming the Two Feature System, in which the
features neat and individuated coincide. If so, it follows that the fis-
sion interpretation of dog, ↓(DOG), is individuated. But that means
that the fission interpretation should allow distributive adjectives like
small and big, with interpretations that distribute to the neat (indi-














∃x ∈↓(DOG) ∩∗small: in the salad(x)
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On this interpretation, (43a) expresses that there are small generator
parts of the split of dog in the salad. The problem is that (43a) of course
doesn’t have such an interpretation.
The diagnosis is that the fission ↓(DOG) should be [–I]. I briefly
mention a few ways of solving this problem:
11.2. The Three Feature System.
We can move from the Two Feature System to a Three Feature System.
In such a system, we do not make the assumption that the generators of
neat nouns are necessarily individuated. (We do continue to make the
mess mass assumption: [–N]⇒ [–I], i.e. mess is non-individuated.) In
the Three Feature System we have the following categories:
[ +C +N +I ] = [+C] count: boys, peas
[ –C –N –I ] = [–N] mess mass: meat, cheese
[ –C +N +I ] = [–C, +I] individuated mass: furniture, kitchenware
[ –C +N –I ] = [–C, +N, –I] fission mass: ↓(DOG)
In this theory, there is a new category, [+N,–I], with neat minimal
generators that are not individuated. Fission interpretations are of this
category, but lexical nouns are not.
It is certainly possible to work in such a theory, but it is also a
bit disappointing. The Two Feature System has a conceptual elegance
that the Three Feature System lacks: in the Two Feature System the
semantically relevant features are all defined in terms of the concep-
tual algebra of part-of structures: part-of, minimal element, generator,
overlap, sum, remainder,. . .
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The theory can do without the feature which has the more complex,
intensional definition (individuated), because the two are identified ex-
tensionally. If it turns out that we can’t maintain the equivalence, we
have to accept that, of course, but it would be attractive if we don’t
have to.
Also, empirically, we have this new linguistically relevant category
[–C, +N, –I], which is not lexically inhabited in any language I know
of. And the question is: why not? Why aren’t there languages where
there are lexical nouns of the category [–C, +N, –I]?
11.3. Fissionk.
An obvious alternative is to change the fission operation, which pro-
duces a neat set, to an operation whose output is mess, not neat.
This is simple enough to do: let context k select a subset of fission
↓k(X) of ↓(X):
Fissionk: ↓k(X) = <↓k(X), gen(↓k(X))>
where: 1. ↓k(X) is a regular set
2. ↓k(X) ⊆ ↓(X)
3. ⊔(↓k(X)) = ⊔(↓(X))
4. gen(↓k(X)) is a set of overlapping generators for ↓k(X)
This is illustrated in the following picture:
Easy as it is, this proposal has a major drawback: it makes ↓k(DOG) a
pretty normal mess mass noun. And that is a problem. We have just
seen that fission interpretations differ from mess mass interpretations,
so it is not clear how the differences we have discussed would be main-
tained in such a theory.
11.4. Super fission.
Fission breaks down an object into its homeopathic mass set, a neat
Boolean algebra. The atoms of that Boolean algebra are the ultimate
minimal parts in the structure M, according to the background Boolean
algebra BOOL.
But what is the status of those postulated minimal parts in M? And
why aren’t these minimal parts in M themselves ground by fission?
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Mass Nouns 62
That is, the arguments that we have given, following Chierchia
(1998), against atomless structures concerned the interpretations of
lexical mass nouns: mess mass nouns and neat mass nouns. But that is
not what we are talking about here at all, here we are talking about
the question of whether the whole structure should be generated from a
background set of ‘ultimate atoms’, and whether fission stops at those
‘ultimate atoms’.
I propose an operation of super fission, which is fission that doesn’t
stop at the contextually provided postulated atoms in M, but breaks
open such atoms.
We extend out interpretation domain BOOL to an interpretation
domain UNIVERSE:
UNIVERSE = <BOOL, SMASH>where:
1. BOOL is, as before, a complete atomic Boolean algebra with
atoms sorted into M-atoms and IND.
2. SMASH is a complete atomless Boolean algebra such that:
1. BOOL ∩ SMASH = M
2. for all m ∈ M: (m]BOOL ⊆ (m]SMASH
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This means that SMASH is an atomless Boolean algebra with M as its
top part, as in the following picture:
And I propose a super fission operation, which is like fission except that
it takes all the Boolean SMASH-parts of the split of dog:
Super fission:⇓(DOG) = <⇓(DOG), ⇓(DOG)–{0}>
⇓(DOG) = (↓o(DOG)]SMASH
The idea of superfission is that the constraints on what counts as a
salient part of the superfission of the dogs are not given by the structure
at all. It is only the context that decides whether something that is part
in the widest sense of the split of dogs is salient enough to count as
a contextually salient fission part. Using an atomless structure is to
remind us that the background atoms of the structure M do not form a
semantic constraint on the fission interpretation.
With this, the feature N now has three values:
neat: [+N] minimal generators do not overlap
mess: [–N] minimal generators overlap
superfine: [# N] minimal generators absent
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The analysis changes only minimally from the Two Feature System:
-The fission interpretation ⇓(DOG) is superfine, which is homeopathic,
and neither neat nor mess.
-For count nouns, neat nouns, and concrete mass nouns like meat and
salt interpretation takes place in BOOL where only the values [±N]
are available. This means that for such lexical nouns only the features
[±C] and [±N] are available, as before, and [#N] is not. So nothing
changes for these nouns.
What about abstract mass nouns?
Abstract mass nouns are all but absent in formal accounts of the
semantics of mass nouns, and it is high time that their semantic prop-
erties are studied rigorously. I cannot at this point speculate about how
they will fit into a theory like the one developed here. I do not know
what the generators of love are (although love has arithmetic proper-
ties, as argued by Cordelia in the first scene of King Lear). I do not
know whether denotations of abstract mass nouns are always atomic.
Tarski, for one, would make a case that the mass interpretations of
the abstract nouns space and time should be superfine, because Tarski
developed the theory of atomless Boolean algebras and their standard
model in the set of regular open sets as the natural background struc-
ture for three dimensional geometry.
In sum: the arguments against atomless structures concerned the
interpretations of lexical mass and count nouns (excluding abstract
nouns). Those arguments are accepted and maintained in the present
theory. We maintain the Two Feature System, in which the intensional
notion individuated is extensionally equated with the structural notion
neat.
We spotted a problem: we must regard fission interpretations as
not neat. But fission interpretations are not mess. We propose that,
since fission interpretations are not lexically constrained anyway—
which means that they are not constrained in terms of requirements
on their generators—we can as well make these interpretations ignore
the atoms that the model BOOL forces upon them, and hence make
them atomless.
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